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Executive Summary 
 
This working paper is based upon a small fieldwork exercise that has served to 
continue a study that extended over the previous 28 years. It is a small exercise 
in a vacuum of sound empirical fieldwork and cannot pretend to be exhaustive. 
We call for a comprehensive examination of the consequences of the stress to 
which rural households in Zimbabwe have been subjected over the past decade is 
much-needed. 
 
Data collected from 18 sites across three provinces reveal an overall decline in 
the size of rural households, especially in resettlement areas established in the 
early 1980s, to which people had once been attracted because of their economic 
success.  Now they are seeking livelihoods elsewhere, and more than half of all 
household members have migrated since 1999. 
 
Earning a livelihood from farming has become very much more difficult during the 
past 10 years.  Inputs are a major problem, and cropped areas—especially cash 
crops—have been reduced across our sample even though cropping diversity has 
increased.  It is only contract farming and donor support in favoured areas that 
have prevented the small-scale farming landscape from becoming a wasteland.  
Mean rates of fertilizer application have dropped to insignificant levels. 
 
Households have sought to modify their livelihood portfolios by migrating, by 
pursuing a wide range of non-farm activities and using social networks and 
transfers. However, there are indications that these alternatives may not be as 
supportive now as they were in the past. 
 
Among the most serious outcomes of the economic turmoil of the past decade 
has been the depletion of families’ livestock assets, even though some have 
managed to increase their herds.  The reduction in herds has not only weakened 
the overall economic resource base but it also has reduced the ability to manage 
the land resource through well-timed tillage. 
 
The work reported here identifies several areas where further work urgently 
needs to be done. 
 
The most important of these is the need for a detailed study of contract farming.  
The last such study in Zimbabwe was done more than 20 years ago, when 
contract farming existed on nothing like its contemporary scale.  Given the 
growing reliance of small-scale farmers on contract farming to provide inputs, 
together with their dissatisfaction at the way current contracts are operating, a 
serious impartial re-examination is called for. 
 
There is also a need to understand better what happens to the household’s asset 
base that supports agricultural activities when household members leave to join 
fast track or to seek other opportunities.  This is particularly true in the original 
resettlement areas where so many families appear to be at the same stage in the 
household cycle, with many younger family members leaving home for multiple 
reasons. 
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1. Background and aim of the study 
 
Over the past decade a political and economic catastrophe has unfolded in 
Zimbabwe. The media regularly report on the ongoing economic and political 
crisis [an oxymoron], highlighting the challenges of making an inclusive 
government work, as well as the impact of inflation, food shortages and 
epidemics afflicting the country. Yet, such general stories only allow us to guess 
what is happening on the ground and tell us little about the challenges, difficulties 
and opportunities ordinary Zimbabweans are facing. At present, there is virtually 
no primary fieldwork-based research going on that can answer many of the 
pressing questions about trajectories of household and individual well-being in the 
rural areas.  This research helps to fill this gap by conducting a study into the 
impact of the crisis in rural farming areas within the framework of a larger study 
specifically focused on processes of impoverishment and accumulation. The study 
is based on case-study fieldwork that links to previous survey data collection for 
the Zimbabwe Rural Household Dynamics Study (ZRHDS).1 
 
The aim of the study is to generate insights on the current situation in small-scale 
farming areas in rural Zimbabwe and to understand the effects of political and 
economic changes that have occurred over the past decade. The research centres 
on how farmers have responded, and are responding, to changes in their socio-
economic environment, particularly the collapse of functional markets. The study 
addresses processes of market disintegration and development of parallel 
markets in times of economic crisis. It is known that farming households differ in 
their capacity/ability to adjust to adverse circumstances. Some households will be 
in a position to seize the opportunities provided by distorted markets, while 
others will retreat or be forced to withdraw from the market. These forces result 
in different trajectories of accumulation and impoverishment, with consequences 
for households’ strategies for confronting risk at the individual level.  Such 
differences are also of critical importance in shaping donors’ responses to the 
current phase of the Zimbabwean crisis. 
 
Important sub-questions are: (i) how have macro-economic developments and 
disintegration of markets in particular affected socio-economic life in rural farming 
areas; (ii) how have these impacts affected household portfolios for earning a 
livelihood; (iii) how do farming families deal with idiosyncratic crisis situations; 
and (iv) what determines success or failure for rural households in such settings? 
These questions have been addressed by revisiting farmers who were included in 
the ZRHDS panel data-set covering the period 1983-2001.2  
 
The remainder of this paper presents some preliminary answers to these 
questions. In the next section we describe the research location and data 
collection. Section three provides an overview of livelihood portfolios of the 
farmers at the end of the 1990s. Section four discusses the influence of macro- 
economic changes over the past decade on agricultural production in the study 
areas. In section five we review the opportunities and constraints for alternative 
livelihood activities. Section six discusses the implications of these developments 
for household investment and wealth. Section seven concludes. 
                                              
1 The ZHRDS, for which fieldwork began in 1983, is the longest continuous panel study of households ever undertaken in Africa.  
The full panel is some 500 households resettled in the early 1980s and 150 households from neighbouring communal areas.  
2 The data collection was funded by The Royal Netherlands Embassy in Harare and The African Studies Centre in Leiden. 
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2. Data and research locations 
 
The research was conducted in 18 primary sites across three locations:  one 
resettlement area (RA) and one neighbouring communal area (CA) in each of 
three provinces. A survey questionnaire was enumerated to 193 households, 143 
in resettlement areas and 50 in communal areas. This household level 
information was complemented with community level data collected separately 
from the household questionnaire. 
 
The three resettlement areas were all resettled in 1980, 1981 and 1982, and the 
three communal areas were chosen for study because they were major sources of 
the small-scale farmers who elected to be resettled in the early 1980s. All the 
sites had previously been surveyed numerous times up until 2001, and some had 
also been surveyed during 2007-09.  In most cases, data are available on the 
households extending as far back in time as the early 1980s, but for the CA 
households the retrospective data begin only in 1997. 
 
The three locations reflect considerably different agro-ecological and economic 
potential.  The six Mashonaland Central sites are all in Natural Region (NR) 2, 
with comparatively high rainfall in a normal year and with an inherently greater 
potential for a wide range of cropping.  There are pronounced local differences in 
soils however that influence the crops that can be best grown.  Bushu, the CA, 
has, as would be expected, soils of lower potential than neighbouring Mupfurudzi 
RA, situated on former commercial farmland.  Cotton has been the primary cash 
crop in the area for decades, but tobacco is increasingly being grown by farmers 
in Mupfurudzi.  With high rainfall, malaria is endemic, along with many other 
diseases and parasites associated with water vectors.  Both adult and child 
nutrition indicators are typically poor.  The nearest towns are Shamva, Bindura 
and Mt. Darwin, and travel connections are relatively easy.  The closure of 
Madziwa Mine north of Shamva in recent years has had adverse effects through a 
reduction in economic opportunities. 
 
The five Mashonaland East sites are all on the boundary of NR3 and possess more 
restricted agricultural potential than the sites in NR2.  The soils are almost 
universally sandy and the area is ideal for tobacco, but tobacco-growing—despite 
encouragement by extension staff—has been undertaken to only a limited extent.  
The area is cool and malaria-free.  Maize remains the major cash crop, and there 
is considerable market gardening of products that can be sold in the nearby 
township of Hwedza and several smaller service centres.  Transportation is 
reasonably accessible. 
 
The seven Manicaland sites all lie in areas of relatively low potential in NR4.  The 
low average rainfall means the area is marginally suited to cropping and better 
endowed for livestock keeping.  In addition, the predominantly light, sandy soils 
favour drought-tolerant crops.  There are however pockets of soil where there is a 
perched water table and where rice can be grown.  Child health and nutritional 
status have consistently been far better in this area than in either of the other 
two.  These sites are very remote, with extremely poor roads, and transportation 
is a problem.  The recent discovery of diamonds in the area has provided a 
stimulus to a range of non-agricultural activities and has witnessed a boom in 
small-scale retailing. 
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3. Livelihoods in the 1990s 
 
Before turning to the question of how rural livelihoods have changed over the 
past decade, we first describe the situation of farmers in the research areas at 
the end of the 1990s. Compared to similar households in communal areas,3 real 
household income of resettled farmers was significantly higher in 1999:  Z$9,255 
for resettled households, compared to Z$5,625 for communal households. The 
sources of income also differed considerably between the two areas (Table 1). For 
resettled households, agriculture was by far the dominant source of income. 
These households also earned some income from off-farm businesses and 
livestock growth and reported small contributions from remittances and female 
income. Although agriculture also constituted a primary source of income to 
communal households, it contributed only 35 percent to total income. Off-farm 
business revenues, remittances and off-farm income contributed more to total 
income compared to the resettled households. Livestock produce, livestock 
growth and female income are proportionally comparable for resettled and 
communal households. In this respect, communal households are very 
comparable to other rural households in Africa that earn on average 30-50 
percent of total income outside the agricultural sector (Reardon 1997). 
 
 
Table 1.—Livelihood portfolios of resettled and communal households* 
 
 Resettled 
households 
Similar communal 
households 
Household income (Z$ 1995) 9255 5625 
 (percentage) 
Of which:   
  Crop income 65 35 
  Off-farm business revenues 11 20 
  Livestock produce   1   1 
  Livestock growth 10   9 
  Remittances   5 16 
  Female income   6   4 
  Off-farm income   2 15 
*Based on ZRHDS data and adjusted from Deininger et al (2004). 
 
 
In non-drought years, resettled households produced maize in excess of 
subsistence needs and most farmers produced cash crops, such as cotton and 
tobacco (Dekker 2004a). Maize production, even in subsistence farming, was 
based on a so-called high-input farming regime; 70-90 percent of farmers used 
hybrid maize in the 1999-2000 cropping season with the highest adoption rate in 
Mupfurudzi (90 percent), followed by 80 percent of the farmers in Mutanda and 
70 percent in Sengezi (Bourdillon et al. 2003).  Thus most farmers participated in 
input (seeds, chemicals and fertilizer) and output (crops, cattle) markets, while 
the labour market, especially on neighbouring commercial farms, offered 
opportunities to generate income for the poorer households or in times of cash 
needs to pay school fees, medical bills or funeral costs.  
 
Compared to communal farmers that applied for resettlement but were rejected, 
resettled households perform better in agriculture. They have higher maize yields 
and higher crop incomes per unit of land, have larger herds, higher expenditures 
and higher valued capital stock. Although the differences in crop income, the 
                                              
3 Similar households in communal areas are households in communal areas that applied for resettlement in the early 1980s but 
were not selected into the programme. 
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value of livestock and the value of capital stock persist on a per-capita basis, the 
differences in per-capita expenditures are lower than expected (Deininger et al. 
2004) because of the larger household sizes in resettlement areas. 
 
 
Table 2.—Mean household size in 2000* 
 
 Resettlement areas Adjacent communal areas 
 2000  2000  
All areas   9.2  6.1  
     
Mupfurudzi 10.9  6.5  
Sengezi   7.2  5.2  
Mutanda   9.6  6.7  
      * All differences statistically significant (0.000). 
        Source: ZRHDS data. 
 
 
Table 2 shows significant differences in household size between resettled and 
communal areas that illustrate and impact on livelihood portfolios. This difference 
is most pronounced in Mupfurudzi, where households on average are 1.7 times 
the size of the households that live in the adjacent communal areas. Such 
differences in household size between resettlement and communal households 
have been found more widely in Zimbabwe (Harts-Broekhuis and Huisman 2001). 
In the communities studied by the ZRHDS, the incidence of nuclear monogamous 
households is lower and vertically extended households are more common in 
resettlement areas compared to communal areas. The fact that more sons stayed 
on their parents’ plot when they were married had to do with the land tenure 
rules in the resettlement areas.  Although each resettled household has more 
land available compared to communal households, the land (both the arable land 
and the residential plot) may not legally be subdivided among sons, nor are sons, 
or others for that matter, allowed to clear land for cultivation and set up their 
own residential plot (at least until the early 2000s).  
 
In communal areas, a different route is followed by married sons who want to 
establish their own households.  Although the area of land that is available for 
expansionary purposes is usually rather small, it is the responsibility of the chief, 
the sub-chief and the village head to allocate land for new families. In practice, in 
resettlement areas many parents did/do allow their son(s) to use a portion of 
their land. This is de facto subdivision, as the son(s) and his wife (or wives) will 
cultivate the portion of land by themselves and have full responsibility for 
investment in inputs, and full ownership of the harvest they obtain. The crops are 
stored separately from the crops of the parents and they have their own kitchen 
to prepare and consume food.4 Alternatively, the son and his wife assist the 
parents in cultivation and share part of the harvest to be able to meet their food 
consumption needs.5 
 
Many married sons who remain with their parents hope to inherit the plot when 
the parents die even though this event might be in the far future.  Such endured 
vertical extension is still a better option than trying to find land in the communal 
areas or to find a job in town, the option many communal area sons pursue. It 
might be more difficult for sons of the resettled households to find land in a 
                                              
4 The ZRHDS data show that 20 percent of all resettled households had separate food stores on their residential stands. 
5 Elsewhere, it is reported that married sons of resettled households illegally occupy land in the resettlement areas (Harts-
Broekhuis and Huisman 2001), while squatting is more generally reported as a result from of scarcity (Moyo 1998). In our 
research areas, squatting is largely restricted to Mutanda, although we have received an occasional report of married sons who 
have settled in the "bush" in Mupfurudzi and Sengezi as well. 
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communal area as their father has moved away, although there are possible ways 
of doing so.6  
 
 
4. Macro-economic changes and agricultural production 
 
Although there is very strong evidence that Zimbabwe’s economic decline began 
in the early 1990s,7 during the past decade simultaneous economic and political 
crises have mushroomed in Zimbabwe, resulting in double-digit negative growth 
rates, sky-rocketing inflation, decline in the rule of law and a disintegration of 
markets, notably rural input, output and labour markets. Although macro-
economic indicators are now showing some signs of improvement, with an 
estimated positive growth rate as compared to the contraction of the economy 
reported until 2009, these macro-economic developments suggest profound 
changes to the socio-economic environment in which rural Zimbabweans are 
managing their everyday lives. In this section we discuss how these changes in 
the (national) economic environment have affected the small holder farmers in 
our study. 
 
The multiple dimensions of the economic collapse that Zimbabwe experienced in 
the decade following 2000 had profound effects on the smallholder farmers 
studied in the ZRHDS schemes. Most notably, the production and distribution of 
inputs were hampered and hyperinflation, combined with delayed payments and 
shortages of money, made the income from agricultural production worthless, 
especially during 2007 and 2008. Although most input-providing companies are 
still active in the study areas, and some new ones have arrived, they have not 
been able to guarantee a sufficient supply of inputs to maintain production levels.  
 
These shortfalls in supply of inputs are reflected clearly in the constraints 
identified by farmers to their agricultural operations during the 2009/10 season.  
As shown in Table 3, although a quarter of the constraints mentioned by farmers 
related to rainfall alone, when combined the various constraints relating to inputs 
constitute almost two-thirds of the total number mentioned. 
 
Across the past decade, the number of farmers using modern inputs (hybrid 
seeds, fertilizer and pesticides) has decreased, as have the quantities applied to 
the crops, as is illustrated by Figure 1. Figure 1 shows for the three resettlement 
areas we examine here the average fertilizer application rate per hectare planted 
for selected seasons from 1985/86 to 2009/10.  The earliest annual average 
application rate was 285kg/ha, whereas the most recent was only 16.5kg/ha—
and this change took place at the same time as resettled farmers were generally 
expanding their cropped area and increasing the areas planted to cash crops.8 
 
                                              
6 Since those resettled in the early 1980s could not take their extended family with them, the grandparents often remained behind. 
Numerous married sons from RAs have now returned to the CAs from which their fathers came in order to inherit the land 
occupied by their grandparents. 
7 See Kinsey (2010b) for a treatment of the long duration of Zimbabwe’s economic ‘crisis’. 
8 While a comparable time series for communal areas is not available, the mean application rates across the CAs in 2008/09 and 
2009/10 were 7.9kg/ha and 12.8kg/ha respectively. 
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Table 3.—Main constraints to cropping operations faced during the 
2009/10 season* 
 
Constraint identified 
Proportion of 
the 297 
constraints 
mentioned 
 (percent) 
Rainfall unreliable, erratic, low, late   25.6 
Lack of seasonal capital to buy farming inputs   20.5 
Lack of cattle/draught power   17.2 
Inputs: difficult to obtain/late arrival/poor access/scarcity/not available   10.4 
Inputs:  Not enough/none     7.7 
Labour shortages:  alone/small family/lack of manpower     5.4 
Personal circumstances: disabled/ill/aged/can't manage farming operations/blindness     3.7 
Crops destroyed/damaged by cattle     2.0 
Lack of working capital (to buy livestock drugs/hire labour/buy & repair equipment)     1.7 
Security of property, loss of land     1.0 
Poor prices/markets     0.7 
Crops attacked by pests     1.3 
No/inadequate farming implements     1.3 
Other (poor soil, no extension service)     0.7 
No constraints     0.7 
Total 100.0 
*Although there may be overlap between some constraints, they have been separated here according 
to the wording used and emphasis given by the farmers. 
 
  
10
30
50
70
90
110
130
150
170
190
210
230
250
270
290
85/86 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 08/09 09/10
Selected growing seasons
K
ilo
gr
am
s 
pe
r h
ec
ta
re
  
Figure 1.—Annual average fertilizer application rates per hectare planted 
for resettled farmers, selected seasons from 1985/86 to 2009/10 
 
 
 
This decline in the availability of fertilizer has resulted in changes in cropping 
patterns as is evidenced in Table 4.  Here, we look specifically at the total 
acreage planted, the acreage under cash crops (tobacco and cotton), the acreage 
under food crops and the diversity of crops grown by farmers. For the full sample, 
we find a slight decrease in the acreage under cultivation, a strong and significant 
decrease in the acreage under cash crops, a marginal increase in the acreage 
under food crops and a significant increase in the diversity of crops grown (Table 
4).  
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Table 4.—Changes in cropping patterns, 2000-2010 
 2000 2010 Sig. diff in mean 
Full sample    
  Total acreagea 5.90 5.51 0.107 
  Cash crops 1.24 0.79 0.010 
  Food crops 4.67 4.72 0.567 
  Crop diversityb 3.32 3.93 0.000 
RA    
  Total acreage 6.66 6.16 0.092 
  Cash crops 1.54 1.01 0.016 
  Food crops 5.10 5.13 0.468 
  Crop diversity 3.44 3.97 0.001 
CA    
  Total acreage 3.79 3.66 0.368 
  Cash crops 0.36 0.14 0.071 
  Food crops 3.43 3.53 0.400 
  Crop diversity 2.98 3.84 0.002 
NR2    
  Total acreage 5.51 5.95 0.807 
  Cash crops 2.70 1.14 0.000 
  Food crops 2.81 4.82 0.000 
  Crop diversity 3.07 4.10 0.000 
NR3    
  Total acreage 5.07 4.08 0.027 
  Cash crops 0.21 0.43 0.136 
  Food crops 4.86 3.65 0.004 
  Crop diversity 3.33 2.77 0.011 
NR4    
  Total acreage 7.27 6.44 0.072 
  Cash crops 0.50 0.73 0.143 
  Food crops 6.77 5.71 0.029 
  Crop diversity 3.62 4.95 0.000 
 Source: ZRHDS data 
a Because most of the farmers in the ZRHDS study are of a generation that grew up without the 
metric system, we use acres here and elsewhere, converting to hectares when it seems helpful to the 
discussion. 
b Crop diversity is the mean number of crops grown per household. 
 
When we look in more detail at the specific crops (Table 5), there is a marked 
reduction in the acreage planted to maize and cotton, while in contrast tobacco 
and rapoko acreage has increased. These patterns are very similar for both 
communal areas and resettlement areas, but vary across natural regions. In NR2, 
where there was always a strong cash crop orientation, we find a marginal 
increase in the acreage under cultivation, a strong reduction in acreage under 
cash crops (acreage more than halved), a significant increase in acreage under 
food crops and greater diversity of crops grown.  
 
Farmers responded to the lack of inputs by reducing their acreage under maize, 
cotton9 and tobacco, and by planting other crops that require less or no inputs. 
For groundnuts, nyemba, nyimo, sunflower and potatoes, seeds are often 
obtained informally through local social networks (e.g. from the granary of the 
neighbour) and the crops are normally planted with no or very little fertilizers.  
 
                                              
9 The average acreage under cotton decreased from 2.17 acres per household in 2000 to 0.30 acres in 2010.  
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In NR3 we find a very different pattern: a significant reduction in the acreage 
planted, a marginal increase in cash crop production (especially farmers taking up 
tobacco farming), a significant decrease in acreage under food crops (especially 
maize) and a decrease in crop diversity. Interestingly, in the late 1990s, this was 
the area with the lowest adoption of new hybrid varieties, and now a considerable 
proportion of the farmers in this region (some 40 per cent in 2010) have taken up 
planting small grains (rapoko, millet and sorghum). In NR4, the acreage under 
cultivation also drops, especially the acreage under food crops, while the diversity 
of crops grown increases. Here, too, the percentage of farmers growing small 
grains grows:  from 60 percent in 2000 to more than 75 per cent in 2010. 
 
Table 5.—Changes in acreage under cultivation (1999/00-2009/2010), 
disaggregated by crop 
Crop 1999/00 2009/2010 Significance level 
 (acreage)  
Maize 3.65 2.95 0.000 
Tobacco 0.14 0.27 0.070 
Cotton 0.90 0.25 0.000 
Groundnuts 0.87 0.75 0.080 
Small grains* 0.49 0.50 0.460 
  Rapoko 0.08 0.15 0.015 
  Sorghum 0.38 0.14 0.000 
  Millet 0.03 0.21 0.000 
Nyimo 0.31 0.21 0.009 
All beans 0.13 0.18 0.090 
Sunflower 0.11 0.28 0.001 
Potatoes 0.004 0.10 0.000 
Rice 0.027 0.008 0.024 
Other 0 0.01 0.030 
* Small grains include rapoko, sorghum and millet combined.  
 
Shortening our perspective and examining changes only over the past two 
seasons both strengthens the observations above and uncovers some small signs 
of positive developments.  As already noted, the “traditional” suppliers of 
agricultural inputs failed completely to meet demand since they were unable to 
cope with hyperinflation and since the supply chain had been broken by the 
consequences of economy-wide failures.  Three factors have helped to mitigate 
these adverse circumstances.  First is growing stability and the slow improvement 
in the economic climate.  Second, there has been a gradual expansion of contract 
farming, with companies providing inputs for cash cropping under the proviso that 
the harvest must be marketed through them.  And third, the donor community—
bilateral and UN agencies as well as NGOs—stepped in and began to import and 
distribute inputs, primarily seed and fertilizers. 
 
The extent of this aid in-kind can be judged by the fact that well over half the 
households included in this study received at least some amount of free seed 
and/or fertilizer during the 2009/10 season.10  As shown in Table 6, the sources 
of this aid were diverse, even though in many cases farmers lacked a clear 
understanding of who was providing it and failed to distinguish between the 
source of the inputs and those who distributed them. 
 
 
  
                                              
10 Six percent of the beneficiaries of free inputs received seed only. 
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Table 6.—Identified providers of free inputs, 2009/10 season 
 
Provider Percent of providers 
Africare     1.01 
Arex officers     2.02 
Catholic Relief Services   17.17 
DAPP (an NGO)   21.21 
Don't know     2.02 
Dhiga Ugute (CADEC/SADC)*     4.04 
FAO   42.42 
Government     5.05 
Named well-wishers     2.02 
PLAN International     1.01 
Red Cross     2.02 
Total 100.00 
 *The source of the Dhiga Ugute (literally ‘Dig to fill your stomach’) 
   inputs could not be ascertained, but it certainly was not SADC.  
 
The inputs provided were in all cases intended to support maize cultivation, and 
the amounts typically made available were sufficient to permit beneficiaries to 
plant approximately one acre of maize.  At even moderate standards of 
cultivation, the output from one acre should have been over a tonne, enough to 
feed a family of five for a year. 
 
While most inputs were delivered early enough to allow planting to be done in 
time to take best advantage of the rains (see Table 7), this was not always the 
case, and well over a tenth of beneficiaries obtained their inputs after the optimal 
planting time had already passed. 
 
It is also significant that all of the very late-supplied inputs—those delivered in 
January and February—came from government sources, a clear indication of 
government’s inability to service the agricultural sector. 
 
 
Table 7.—Month of receipt of aid-provided farm inputs, 
2009/10 season 
 
Year and month Input provided 
 Seed Fertilizer 
2009 (percent of deliveries) 
 October 30.53  30.00 
 November 56.84  57.78 
 December   9.47    8.89 
2010   
 January    2.11    2.22 
 February    1.05    1.11 
 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Nor, at least among the households surveyed, were free inputs distributed in a 
completely equitable fashion.  While each individual donor undoubtedly had its 
own criteria to determine eligibility for receipt of inputs, there are significant 
differences in the geographical distribution (Table 8).  Most striking is the 
concentration of inputs according to agro-ecological potential, a finding that 
perhaps makes some sense when all the inputs provided are in support of maize 
cultivation.  There is also however a striking bias in favour of communal areas. 
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Table 8.—Percentage of households surveyed which  
received free inputs, 2009/10 season, by area 
 
 
Area 
Households 
receiving inputs 
 (percent) 
By Natural Region  
  2 93.2 
  3 34.4 
  4 16.9 
  Total 51.3 
    Significance level 0.000 
  
By tenure regime  
  Communal areas 70.0 
  Resettled areas 44.8 
  Total 51.3 
    Significance level 0.000 
By specific locality  
  Communal area  
    Bushu   82.4 
    Chigwedere 100.0 
    Marange   25.0 
  Resettled areas  
    Mupfurudzi   96.4 
    Sengezi     9.1 
    Mutanda   14.0 
  Total   51.3 
    Significance level 0.002  
 
At the level of individual locality, the differences are even more pronounced 
although slightly less significant.  All the respondents in one communal area—
Chigwedere, for example—received inputs, while less than ten percent in the 
neighbouring resettlement area—Sengezi—did.  Such differences are difficult to 
explain. 
 
Some of the results above can also be explained by the fact that NGOs have 
particular areas of operation.  For example, in the areas surveyed, Catholic Relief 
Services was operating solely in communal areas, while DAPP was operating 
solely in a single resettlement area.  Government also operated solely in 
resettlement areas.  FAO, in contrast, was active in roughly proportionate terms 
across the communal and resettlement areas covered. 
 
Nevertheless, across the sample as a whole, there are indications that the 
provision of inputs through aid, together with the gradually improving economic 
climate, have led to improvements over the dismal performance in the decade 
following 2000.  Table 9 compares cropping patterns and levels of fertilizer 
utilization across the two most recent seasons—2008/09 and 2009/10.  The focus 
here is on plots planted to specific crops rather than on the holding as a whole, 
and the reason for this approach is that a single land holding often has multiple 
growers of any given crop.  Thus, for example, one holding in a resettlement area 
may have four different plots of maize, each cultivated by different individuals 
according to different standards.11 
 
                                              
11 Over two percent of growers over all areas do not reside on the holding where they are growing their crops. 
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Among the more general conclusions that may be drawn from Table 9 is that 
average maize plot areas and fertilizer application rates changed very little 
between the two years, and much the same is true for groundnuts, although the 
proportion of the total holding area planted to maize declined.  The most striking 
change is the more than doubling in the number of tobacco growers and a strong 
increase in the numbers of tobacco growers applying fertilizer and in fertilizer 
application rates.12    Also striking is the expansion in the proportion of holdings 
planted to cotton and the mean area per grower, however—despite almost no 
change in the proportion of growers applying fertilizer—there is a remarkable 
drop in the rate of application per hectare.13 
 
Nevertheless, as noted above, overall application rates remain extremely low.  
Between 2008/09 and 2009/10, resettlement area farmers only managed to 
increase their average application rate per hectare of planted land from 
15.3kg/ha to 16.5kg/ha while communal area farmers increased from 7.9kg/ha to 
12.8kg/ha. 
 
The general shortage of inputs almost certainly helps explain why resettled 
farmers planted only some 52-55 percent of their available land in both 2008/09 
and 2009/20 and why communal farmers planted only two-thirds of their 
available land in 2008/09 and only 57 percent the following season.  
 
Evidence on any changes in use of other inputs is less informative.  In both 
2008/09 and 2009/10, despite citing lack of draught power as a constraint, only 
about three percent of all plots failed to be ploughed in both seasons.  It would be 
more informative to know when they were ploughed, as late ploughing leads to 
late planting and lower yields.  The decline in the number of cattle (reported later 
in this paper) suggests strongly that ploughing teams are being shared and, as a 
result, some plots are inevitably ploughed late.  Although labour is cited as a 
growing constraint over time, particularly by resettled farmers, only something 
over six percent of growers hired labour during the 2009/10 season.  Two factors 
are at work here.  One is the aging profile of resettled farmers and the departure 
of their working-age children to marital households or to seek other economic 
opportunities, and the other is the shortage of capital to hire labour. 
                                              
12 The decline in mean tobacco area per grower is to be expected since new entrants into tobacco cultivation are inexperienced, 
and they also have not yet constructed sufficient barn capacity to be able to cure the harvest from a larger area. 
13 A partial explanation for this phenomenon is that growers of cotton on credit reported to the research team that they diverted 
some of the fertilizer received for cotton to their maize crop. 
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 Table 9.—Changes in cropping patterns and fertilizer application rates 
between the 2008/09 and 2009/10 seasons, all areasa 
 
Year & crop Total 
number 
of  
plots b 
Proportion 
of total 
area 
planted 
Mean 
area per 
grower 
Proportion 
of 
growers 
applying 
fertilizer 
Mean 
quantity of 
fertilizer 
applied per 
grower 
Mean 
quantity of 
fertilizer 
applied per 
hectare 
  (percent) (hectares) (percent) (kg) (kg) 
2008/09       
Maize 228 53.80 1.04 57.85 112.0 108.0 
Groundnuts 174 13.65 0.34  0.00    0.0    0.0 
Rapoko  43  2.70 0.27  0.02    0.6    2.1 
Mhunga  29  3.86 0.52  0.00    0.0    0.0 
Sorghum  41  2.44 0.26  0.02    0.5   1.89 
Nyimo  77  3.76 0.21  0.00    0.0    0.0 
Tobacco  20  4.81 1.04 90.00 431.1 413.0 
Sunflower  65  4.97 0.35  0.03    1.8    5.6 
Cotton  26  4.46 0.74 84.62 106.0 142.0 
All beans  65  3.32 0.24 14.29    6.0  26.1 
Rice   6  0.14 0.10  0.00    0.0    0.0 
All potatoes  70  1.97 0.13  0.05    0.6    4.4 
All others   5  0.12 0.13  0.00    0.0    0.0 
       2009/10       
Maize 234 49.45 0.95 64.00 106.1 109.3 
Groundnuts 187 15.62 0.37   0.01c      0.5c      1.2c 
Rapoko   18  1.16 0.29  0.06    0.3    0.7 
Mhunga   28  4.04 1.00  0.00    0.0    0.0 
Sorghum   32  2.19 0.54  0.13    6.7   16.6 
Nyimo   85  4.31 0.23  0.01    1.2     2.9 
Tobacco   47  7.39 0.39 99.98 329.6 442.2 
Sunflower   37  2.42 0.29  5.40    3.0   10.3 
Cotton   41  8.71 1.04 85.37    96.0d    91.8d 
All beans   62  3.06 0.22 14.52    8.3   38.0 
Rice     5  0.25 0.02  0.00    0.0     0.0 
All potatoes   49  1.23 0.09  0.04    1.8   16.3 
All others     8  0.17 0.01  0.13    0.3    2.3 
a A total of 193 households in both RAs and CAs in each season. 
b There may be multiple plots of any given crop for a household and, because of the frequency of 
shared responsibilities for many plots, there will normally be many more “growers” than plots. 
c It is believed that applications of gypsum have been misreported as fertilizer applications. 
d Underestimates because of the failure of some growers who had credit for inputs to specify the 
quantity of fertilizer they received, perhaps because they were diverting it to maize. 
 
 
Although we have attempted to emphasize the positive aspects of economic 
recovery and the assistance provided to small-scale farmers, the assessment 
given by farmers themselves is far less positive.  At a time when the outcome of 
the 2009/10 season was daily becoming more apparent, farmers reported their 
expectations as shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10.—The anticipated harvest from the 2009/10 season in 
comparison with all previous harvests  
farming in the same area 
 
Expectation (percent) 
Much better than average 11.46 
Average 32.81 
Much worse than average 29.17 
The worst we have ever had 26.56 
 
Although the norm was an expectation for an average harvest, the majority 
feared something very much worse. 
 
It was noted earlier that one characteristic that set resettlement areas off from 
communal areas during the 1980s and 1990s was the high levels of sales of 
agricultural produce.  Crop sales were the major source of income for 
resettlement areas.  Looking at the disposal of the harvest from the 2008/09 
season indicates that farmers are retaining a far greater proportion of their crops 
and selling much less than in the past. 
 
There are at least three reasons for this change in behaviour.  One is that a 
decade of hyperinflation taught farmers that selling crops immediately post-
harvest to raise cash and then, if necessary, purchasing staple food supplies later 
in the season was a losing game.  Cash lost its value so quickly that it was far 
wiser to hold on to any surplus crops in the sure knowledge that physical stocks 
would lose any value much more slowly.  The second factor is that, with the 
collapse of the market for inputs, crop yields declined so that farmers simply had 
much smaller surpluses than in the past.  A third reason is that the market prices 
being offered for certain commodities were so low that farmers withheld crops 
from market, even such crops as tobacco and cotton. 
 
Overall, only 22 percent of all growers of all crops sold anything following the 
harvest in 2009, and for those who did sell the quantities were normally very 
small.  As in the past, the proportion selling differs between resettlement and 
communal areas.  In the former, just over 24 percent sold any of the crops 
harvested, while in the communal areas the proportion selling was very low—well under 10 
percent. 
 
 
 
5. Opportunities and constraints for alternative livelihood activities 
 
 
Non agricultural incomes.  
The reported changes in agricultural production suggest that incomes from 
agriculture dropped dramatically.14 Moreover, alternative sources of income were 
less easily found and less locally available than previously. Before, the adjacent 
commercial farms often provided opportunities to earn a seasonal income when 
times were tough (e.g. by working temporary jobs such as weeding or harvesting 
during peak labour-demand times). With the “fast-track land reform programme” 
(FTLRP), these opportunities virtually disappeared. Reports on the non-
agricultural activities that farmers often were involved in reveal difficulties in 
accessing alternative sources of income.  The reasons for this are because either 
                                              
14 The hyperinflation experienced over the past decade and the associated change in currency from Zimbabwe dollars to US 
dollars makes it very hard to calculate actual reductions in agricultural incomes. 
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farmers did not have the money to invest in such activities (for example, trading) 
or no materials were available.  At the same time, in the context of secularly 
deteriorating agricultural incomes, the local demand for products such as sleeping 
mats, pots, etc. dropped as well.  
 
During the data collection exercise in 2010, households identified 340 non-
farming activities that they were engaged in or had engaged in during the 
previous 12 months. This is an average of some 1.75 activities per household, a 
figure that compares with the number of activities reported in the early 1990s, 
but is considerably lower than the 2 to 3 activities households were engaged in in 
the late 1990s. 
 
The range of activities reported is far-ranging, even with the compressed 
presentation in Table 11.  Gardening, exclusively a woman’s activity, is the 
primary activity reported, as has been the case in past ZRHDS survey rounds.15  
Gold-panning also regularly appears, as does petty trading.  What appears to 
have assumed increased importance however is casual labouring.  Given the 
virtual disappearance of commercial farms, it comes as a surprise that nearly 20 
percent of the sample reported casual labour as a source of income.  But, since 
only 2.9 percent of all activities took place on a commercial farm, the conclusion 
must be that many have found opportunities to do piece-work in their own 
communities.  This conclusion is supported by the fact that nearly half of all non-
farm activities are undertaken in the same village where the participants live, 
while another quarter are in a neighbouring village. 
 
 
Table 11.—Non-farm income-earning activities reported to have been 
undertaken during 2009-10 
Activity 
Percentage of 
households involved 
Selling garden produce or fruits   34.1 
Casual labouring/piece-work   19.1 
Gold-panning/diamond mining    7.6 
Petty trading/vending: blankets/clothes/paraffin/knives/etc    6.2 
Building/carpentry/painting/thatching/brick-making/well-digging    5.9 
Handicrafts/carving yokes/pottery/reed mats    4.7 
Rearing and selling poultry    3.2 
Metalwork: blacksmith/tinsmith/welding    2.9 
Selling milk    2.9 
Formal employment (full- or part-time)    2.4 
Fishing and selling fish    1.8 
Security/neighbourhood police/guard    1.5 
Sewing and selling clothes    1.5 
Repairs: shoes/umbrella/bicycles/clothes    1.2 
Traditional healer/herbalist/treating people or animals    1.2 
Selling firewood or grass    0.9 
Barber/hairdresser    0.6 
Pension    0.6 
Rent: money from lodgers    0.6 
Others: beer-brewing/goat-keeping/selling fruit trees, etc    1.2 
  Total 100.0 
  
                                              
15 It should be noted that in Zimbabwe gardening is not considered farming.  The term farming is applied only to field crops, 
whereas most gardening takes place in women’s domains—around or near the homestead. 
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It should be noted that not all the income earned from such activities is in the 
form of cash.  Indeed, the most common form of payment is a combination of 
both in-cash and in-kind, but exclusively in-kind payments still make up almost 
30 percent of the total.  While more detailed analysis is needed, this pattern 
suggests that more people are seeking piece-work to meet very specific needs 
that they cannot access very easily in the marketplace. 
 
Migration away from the old resettlement areas. 
When reviewing the changes in agricultural and non-agricultural activities, the 
findings suggest contracting opportunities to make a living and changing patterns 
of livelihoods. In anticipation and response to these changes, many people went 
away in search for greener pastures.  
 
In the survey, we collected information on almost 3000 individuals that at one 
time lived on the homesteads of the respondents interviewed. Table 12 indicates 
that just over half of these individuals no longer live with the respondents, and 
the large majority (more than 85 percent) of those who no longer live there left 
after 1999. This pattern is strongest in resettlement areas and in the areas with 
the highest agro-ecological potential and is related to the strong effect of 
migration to the new resettlement schemes created during the fast-track 
resettlement process.  The migration led to considerable changes in household 
size between 2000 and 2010, as reported in Table 13, particularly in Mupfurudzi 
where so many sons remained living and farming on their parents’ plot after they 
got married and started their own families. 
 
 
Table 12.—Percentage of household members migrating after 1999 
 
Location Percentage 
Full sample 52  
  
Resettlement Areas 53  
Communal Areas 45  
  
Natural Region 2 59  
Natural Region 3 53  
Natural Region 4 40 
 
 
 
Table 13.—Mean household size in 2000 and 2010* 
 
 Resettlement areas Adjacent communal areas 
 2000 2010 2000 2010 
All areas   9.2 7.4 6.1   5.9 
     
Mupfurudzi 10.9 6.1 6.5   6.1 
Sengezi   7.2 7.5 5.2   4.9 
Mutanda   9.6 9.0 6.7   6.8 
      * All differences statistically significant (0.000). 
        Source: ZRHDS data. 
 
 
The tendency of married sons leaving their parents plots to establish their own 
farm in the 2000s is confirmed when we look at the characteristics of the 
migrants. The average age of migrants was 26 years, but there was a clear 
difference in age for those leaving before 1999 (31 years) and after 1999 (25 
years). If we look more closely at the relationship of the migrant to the household 
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head, it is quite clear that after 1999, the majority of individuals leaving are adult 
sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren (Table 14), who often left as families. 
In the full sample, 42 percent of the migrants leaving before 1999 were adult 
children, their spouses and children. After 1999, this figure was 62 percent. These 
differences are significant across all regions and settlement types except for NR3. 
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the migrants who left the household 
since 1999.  
 
Table 14.—Adult children, their spouses and children as a 
percentage of migrants* 
 
 Period when migration occurred 
 Before 1999 
(n=168) 
After 1999 
(n=1157) 
 (percentage) 
Full sample 42 62 
   
Resettlement Areas 44 63 
Communal Areas 15 58 
   
Natural Region 2 40 48 
Natural Region 3 62 70 
Natural Region 4 33 81 
* All differences are significant except for NR3. 
 
 
The importance of new farming opportunities is also reflected in the target 
location for which migrants left, presented in Table 15. Other rural areas (most 
likely FTLRP schemes) were most often cited as the location to which migrants 
went. This is the case for all regions and settlement types.  
 
Table 15.—Current place of residence of migrant household membersa 
 
 Within 
the 
village 
RA or CAb Other 
rural 
area 
Harare Other 
town 
Outside 
Zimbabwe 
Full sample 17 8 36 16 10 4 
       
Resettlement  17 7 37 14 8 3 
Communal 14 11 29 22 15 6 
       
Region 2 21 11 38 7 8 1 
Region 3 5 5 31 29 8 10 
Region 4   22        7    38    15   15         1 
a Differences between settlement types and natural regions are significant. 
b RA refers to those living in the same resettlement area but not in their original village. 
 
 
Interestingly, there are some clear differences between settlement types and 
regions when it comes to the other locations that people went to. Movements 
within the village (through marriage, occupying vacant plots or moving to newly 
created residential homesteads)16 are particularly evident in NR2 and NR4, while 
Harare and other urban areas are important destinations for communal 
households and households resident in NR3 and NR4, reflecting a historically 
                                              
16 In Mupfurudzi, we received reports that some village heads decided to create new residential homesteads in their village to 
allow adult children and their families to occupy their own stands. The agricultural fields belonging to the original household 
heads were not extended and were still informally subdivided.  
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stronger orientations toward work in town in these areas. Migration to other 
countries in the region or further away, was strongest in NR3.  
 
Members who left the household to settle in a fast-track scheme acquired on 
average 13 acres (5.3ha) of land in their new place of residence. The majority of 
farmers received somewhat less—around 12 acres, while a few received only one 
acre and six migrants were able to acquire more than 20 acres. More than 30 
percent of the migrants who went to the fast-track schemes took cattle with them 
when they moved to their new farms (on average 1.8 with a range of between 2 
and 40), and a similar percentage took equipment. Potentially this means young 
able-bodied migrants deprived the remaining household members of labour, 
cattle and equipment to work in the fields (as is suggested by farmers’ listing of 
the constraints affecting them). This aspect requires more detailed analysis.  
 
For migrants who relocated to a different stand in the same village, the 
percentages relocating cattle—and equipment—were much lower and many 
respondents reported they still share cattle and equipment, and possibly labour, 
with the intra-village migrants. 
 
The members who left the households to look for work predominantly went to 
Harare, other towns in Zimbabwe, or somewhere outside Zimbabwe. Many of 
them were successful in finding a job; only 12 percent failed to do so. The 
occupations most frequently mentioned were piece-worker, domestic worker, 
vendor, teacher or some other job in the public administration, soldier or police 
force, skilled manual worker, or farm worker. 
 
Table 16 below reports information on well-being for those who left the 
homestead to go to the fast-track areas, to a new plot in the same village, to 
work elsewhere, or for other reasons. The majority of labour migrants or migrants 
to the fast track resettlement schemes were perceived to be better off now (often 
with reference to the investment in equipment, buildings and cattle that have 
been realized). Movements within the village are more frequently associated with 
no changes in well-being, although also a considerable proportion of previous 
residents are perceived to be better off. 
 
 
 
Table 16.—Perceived welfare of those who left the homestead for optional 
locations and/or activities 
 
Perceived 
welfare 
Fast track Village plot Work Other 
 (percent) 
Better Off 54 37 58 46 
Similar  28 47 25 19 
Worse Off  7   4  7   9 
Not Known17 10 12 10 26 
     
 
 
 
 
                                              
17 Respondents could not tell us about the well-being of the migrants, either because they lost contact with them, or respondents 
indicated the move away from the homestead was so recent, no changes could have been observed.  
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Changes in sources of money for expenditures.   
With the available resources for the survey, it was impossible to include 
instruments to collect detailed expenditure data as has been done in past rounds 
of the ZRHDS.  An alternative, if somewhat less satisfactory approach, is taken 
here of looking at livestock sales. A household’s livestock portfolio has always 
served the function of a store of reserve value that can be called upon when 
necessary.  Livestock assets have been seriously depleted over the past decade, 
as will be discussed in more detail in the next section.  As a result there have 
been changes in both the types and numbers of animals sold and in the 
expenditure categories for which animals are sold (Table 17). 
 
 
Table 17.—The use of livestock disposals to meet expenditure needs, 
2001 and 2010 
Reasons for selling or bartering livestock 2001 2010 
  To buy implements, farm assets    1.6    1.2 
  To help relatives or friends    0.3    0.0 
  To buy food  27.7  27.1 
  To buy other general, non-food goods  10.6  15.3 
  To buy seeds/fertilizer  15.5  14.1 
  To buy livestock    3.2    2.4 
  To pay for services (e.g., labour, grinding, etc)    0.6    2.4 
  To repay loans    1.9    0.0 
  To pay for the use of land    0.3    0.0 
  To pay for travel expenses    1.9    3.5 
  To pay taxes/levies    0.6    0.0 
  To buy building materials, construction    0.6    0.0 
  To pay for health expenses    6.5    2.4 
  To pay education expenses/fees  11.9  15.3 
  To pay marriage expenses    3.9    3.5 
  To pay for repairs    0.6    1.2 
  For savings    3.9    0.0 
  For business -- To invest/reinvest into a business    3.5    2.4 
  Animal was very old / ill    0.0    4.7 
  Other    4.5    4.7 
    Total 100.0 100.0 
 
 
The first point to be made is that the sales in 2010 are generated from a 
restricted range of animal types.  While small stock such as pigs, sheep, calves, 
rabbits and donkeys were all sold in 2001, none of these types of animals was 
sold a decade later, yet cattle sales—at just under 50 percent of total 
transactions—remain at about the same level in both years. While the major 
expenditure priorities remained much the same, households had a much smaller 
base to draw on in meeting them.  Moreover, continuing to sell cattle threatens to 
reduce household herds below the point of reproductive viability, further reducing 
tillage capacity and the supply of milk.  
In the straitened circumstances of 2010, some expenditure categories vanished 
altogether, including raising cash to help friends, to repay loans, and for savings.  
Business investment also declined.  In contrast, several of the more wide-ranging 
expenditure categories—general  purchases, paying for services, travel and 
education—assumed greater importance, suggesting that households’ remaining 
livestock resources were being used more-and-more to finance day-to-day 
expenditure. 
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Networks and transfers.   
Changes in the social and economic environment may also have effects on the 
assistance networks that exist within the villages, across villages and across rural 
and urban landscapes. Previous work in the study areas has demonstrated the 
importance of assistance networks in coping with crisis situations as well as day-
to-day activities (Dekker 2004, Barr 2004, Barr et al 2010).  While the population 
movements, cash constraints and other deteriorations in economic conditions in 
the 2000s probably increased the need for collective action, many non-religious 
community-based organizations (CBOs) and other networks were also badly 
affected by the same events. Preliminary results on a sub-sample of six villages 
from our study areas shows that almost 75 percent of the CBOs that were active 
in 2000 no longer existed in 2008. This may have severe repercussions on 
exchanges within the community. 
In the 2000 and 2010 survey, we also collected information on the 
assistance relationships the households in the study areas have with other 
households, either through providing assistance to or receiving assistance from 
them. The information in Table 18 shows that, overall, the proportion of 
households engaged in provision of assistance, either as a giver or receiver, has 
gone down between 2000 and 2010, especially in resettlement areas and Natural 
Region 2.18  However, a large majority of the households are still engaged in 
these informal arrangements.  
 
 
Table 18.—Percentage of households reporting giving or receiving 
assistance, from/to other households 
 
 Year of survey  
 2000 2010 Significance level 
 (percentage of households)  
Full sample 90 84 0.090 
    Resettlement 89 79 0.030 
Communal 94 98 0.298 
    Natural Region 2 89 77 0.068 
Natural Region 3 87 82 0.477 
Natural Region 4 95 95 1.000 
 
 
Table 19 provides more detailed information on the types of assistance provided 
and received, and covers, for example, labour involved in childcare, food or tillage 
(ploughing fields) and cash assistance to cover medical or educational expenses, 
costs for agricultural production or investment , etc.19  The disaggregation by 
type of assistance provides an interesting distinction. Generally, the proportion of 
households which gave assistance to other households increased between 2000 
and 2010. This is especially the case for taking care of children, providing tillage 
or labour services and granting cash gifts or loans to other households so they 
can finance medical or other expenditures.  For only one type of assistance given 
did we find a considerable decline: the percentage of households providing cash 
assistance to pay for funeral expenses decreased from 96 to 46 percent.20 
 
 
 
                                              
18 The information in this table only captures the percentage of households involved and does not address the numbers or 
volumes of assistance involved. 
19 Again, Table 19 captures the percentage of households involved in providing or receiving assistance and not the volume of 
assistance involved.  
20 Cash contributions to funeral expenses could be either a contribution to the household that hosts a funeral or a cash gift/loan to 
a household for the customary contribution by community and family members to another household’s funeral. 
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Table 19.—Percentage of households reporting giving or receiving 
assistance, by type of assistance* 
 
 Year of survey 
Type of assistance 2000 2010 
  (percentage of households) 
Assistance given   
  Childcare 10 32 
  Food 16 14 
  Tillage services   9 35 
  Milk  9 10 
  Non-paid labour assistance 42 47 
  Other labour  4 16 
  Cash for medical expenses  3 10 
  Cash for funerals 96 46 
  Cash for education  3  7 
  Cash for farming  0  0 
  Cash for food  1  0 
  Cash for agricultural investment  0  1 
  Cash for business investment  0  1 
  Other cash  1  9 
   Assistance received   
  Childcare  6  4 
  Food  3  1 
  Tillage services 11 21 
  Milk  2  5 
  Non-paid labour assistance 19 27 
  Other labour  3  8 
  Cash for medical expenses  5  8 
  Cash for funerals 10  8 
  Cash for education  8  6 
  Cash for farming  4  2 
  Cash for food 20  9 
  Cash for agricultural investment  0  0 
  Cash for business investment  1  1 
  Other cash  0  0 
* For almost all types of assistance, the proportion of households reporting giving assistance is larger 
than the proportion of households receiving assistance. This difference cannot necessarily be 
interpreted as a sign that the respondents are net givers of assistance as we do not consider the 
volumes of assistance involved, and there may be a reporting bias between giving and providing 
assistance. 
 
The percentage of households receiving assistance from other households has not 
increased to the same extent.  Although we see an increase in the percentage of 
households that received tillage and other labour services from other households, 
the proportion of households receiving cash assistance has generally decreased—
with the exception of medical expenses.  
 
Coping with individual risk.   
Along the more threatening risks individuals living in farming areas face is that of 
poor health.  If an adult is so badly affected by illness or injury as to be unable to 
work, particularly at critical times of the growing season, the agricultural output—
and food supply—of the entire household is jeopardized for an entire year.  Thus 
the individual risk translates into a societal problem. 
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While the communal areas we studied have been fairly well supplied with clinics 
for a long time, the resettlement areas were only supplied with clinics in the early 
1980s.  In the 1980s and 90s, these clinics provided free treatment and a wide 
range of health-monitoring and preventative programmes as well as a referral 
service with ambulance support.  They were often also the centres for child-
feeding programmes in serious drought years.  By the late 1990s, however, the 
clinics—along with the health budget as a whole—were suffering from serious 
underfunding.  Just a few years thereafter, the rural clinics had run out of medical 
supplies altogether and backup from urban centres had dwindled to nearly 
nothing. 
 
In 2000 the most important reason people gave for not going for medical 
consultation was that the illness was mild (68 percent) and none referred to the 
costs involved in treatment as a deterrent.  In 2010, the main reason for not 
going for consultation was that the facility was too expensive (31 percent), while 
22 percent indicated the illness was mild. Disease patterns are very similar in 
both years, with respiratory diseases, including TB, malaria and general aches 
and pains (teeth, eyes/limbs) being the main symptoms referred to by patients.  
  
Table 20.—Responses to illness and health problems 
 
 Year of survey 
 2000 2010 
 (percent) 
Households affected 55 70 
   Actions of   
households affected   
  Bought medicines 60 34 
  No consultation 35 23 
  Consulted clinic/nurse 47 63 
  Consulted doctor/hospital   8   6 
  Consulted VHWa   6   2 
  Consulted prophet/n’angab   2   7 
   
         a Village Health Worker. 
         b A prophet is a spiritual healer associated with certain religions, while 
a n’anga is a traditional healer who makes use of herbs, charms and spells. 
 
 
Table 20 reports that the proportion of households who bought medicines in case 
of illness has dramatically reduced from 60 to 34 percent. At the same time, we 
see an increase in the proportion of households who visit a clinic when confronted 
with an illness. Village Health Workers are less often consulted, while 
consultations with a prophet or traditional healer are on the increase, albeit still 
low. 21 
 
 
6. Household investment and wealth 
 
Decreasing cash incomes have also led to changes in investment behaviour. We 
do have more detailed information on investment in livestock, often considered 
an important marker of wealth in Zimbabwe (Hoogeveen 2001). Previous work on 
the ZRHDS data has demonstrated that (resettled farmers) invest strongly in 
cattle, and the sale of cattle or other livestock is an important coping mechanism 
                                              
21 It should be noted that these findings are suggestive of changes in the utilization of health care services, but they are based on 
the perceptions of households that are very much affected by the current economic context and may not necessarily reflect actual 
health status. Information on the latter (as measured by nutritional status) has not been captured in any of the post-2001 surveys. 
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during hard times such as drought, death, illnesses etc. (Kinsey et al. 1998, 
Kinsey 2010b, Bourdillon et al. 2003, Dekker 2004b).When the domestic cattle 
herd is considered in terms of ox-equivalents, as in Table 21, there are clear signs 
of disinvestment. The households that resettled in the early 1980s on average 
owned just over the equivalent of 7 oxen by 1998 and experienced a significant 
decline in herd size to 5.87 in 2000 and to 3.64 in 2010. Similar declines were 
experienced by all farmers across settlement types and natural regions, with the 
exception of those living in NR3.  
  
Table 21.—Ox-equivalent livestock assets, 2000 and 2010 
 
 2000 2010 Significance levels  
 (ox-equivalents)  
Full sample 5.87 3.64 0.000 
  CA 4.06 2.42 0.014 
  RA 6.52 4.07 0.000 
  NR2 6.41 3.21 0.000 
  NR3 4.33 3.15 0.137 
  NR4 6.79 4.69 0.058 
    Full sample    
  No lseq   8.25 17.62 0.050 
  Less than 1 lseq 16.40 37.82 0.000 
  Less than 2 lseq 22.68 47.67 0.000 
CA    
  No lseq   9.80 18.00 0.532 
  Less than 1 lseq 17.65 46.00 0.014 
  Less than 2 lseq 31.37 56.00 0.023 
RA    
  No lseq   7.69 17.48 0.100 
  Less than 1 lseq 16.08 34.97 0.002 
  Less than 2 lseq 19.58 44.76 0.000 
NR2    
  No lseq   4.05 19.18 0.007 
  Less than 1 lseq 10.81 39.73 0.001 
  Less than 2 lseq 17.57 53.42 0.000 
NR3    
  No lseq 16.39 26.23 0.523 
  Less than 1 lseq 31.15 44.26 0.296 
  Less than 2 lseq 37.70 52.46 0.134 
NR4    
  No lseq   5.08   6.78 0.697 
  Less than 1 lseq   8.47 28.81 0.005 
  Less than 2 lseq 13.56 35.59 0.005 
 
 
The contracting herd sizes are visible not only when considering the average 
number of oxen-equivalent beasts, but also when looking at the proportion of 
livestock-poor households in the schemes. Just over ten years ago, Kinsey et al 
(1998) wrote in their analysis of the importance of cattle in resettlement areas, 
“The problem of zero stocks (as a result of a series of negative shocks) … is not 
relevant for our population as a whole.” The continuous economic crisis has in 
fact resulted in a situation where the problem of zero stocks has become relevant 
indeed, with a doubling of the number of households that do not have any cattle 
at all to a proportion of 18 per cent in 2010. The percentage of households with 
just one or just two lseq also more than doubled between 2000 and 2010, from 
16 to 38 percent (for 1 lseq) and from 23 to 48 percent (for 2 lseq) respectively. 
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With so few livestock resources left, these households risk being trapped in 
poverty, as was suggested by Hoogeveen (2001).22 Interestingly, this reduction in 
herd size and increase in the number of livestock poor is not uniform across 
regions. The number of livestock-poor increases most notably in NR2.  
 
Another perspective is offered in Figure 2, in which we look at the changes in 
cattle numbers over time for the period 1983 to 2001. Over the entire period 
herd sizes have grown remarkably steadily from one year to the next at the same 
time that the proportion of families without cattle declined from some 40 per cent 
to under 10 per cent (Kinsey et al.  1998).  The average family herd increased 
from 4 animals in 1983 to 10 in 2001 and, until 2000, cattle holdings were a good 
hedge against inflation.   
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Figure 2. Size and real value of domestic cattle herds, 
resettled households, 1983 – 2001 
  
Thus, whether the accumulation of cattle is treated as capital or as investments 
out of income, the ability to realize a return from a herd of a given size differs 
dramatically from season to season.  It was only government’s failure to manage 
inflation that crippled households’ ability to smooth consumption and investment 
through livestock sales. It cannot be established with certainty whether having a 
larger number of cattle helps households in moving up the income scale, or 
whether it is a consequence of higher incomes (Kinsey 2010a).  Whichever may 
be the case, households have experienced a serious decline in their economic 
welfare.   
 
At least one qualification should be made to the figures in Table 21. This 
particular wealth indicator represents wealth in terms of animal assets at a 
household level. At the same time, we know that these households have been 
highly affected by migration. When household members moved to other farming 
areas to start their own farms (especially adult sons who farmed on their father’s 
plot), some have taken cattle and agricultural equipment with them, as reported 
in section five. Indeed, when we consider per-capita animal wealth, a different 
picture emerges: overall there was a slight and non-significant decrease in the 
                                              
22 Extreme examples of the way in which herds can be depleted for very little reward occurred in one of the study areas in 2008, 
when one cow was being exchanged for only 20kg of maize. 
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number of animals per household member between 2000 and 2010 (Table 22). 
The decrease generally took place between 2000 and 2007 (significant in the full 
sample), after which per-capita animal wealth picked up again. Notable 
exceptions are the households in communal areas; these witnessed a significant 
decrease in per-capita cattle assets from 2000 to 2007 and 2010. Households in 
NR3 were less severely affected. Both on average and on a per-capita basis, they 
did not lose any cattle between 2000 and 2007; however they did experience a 
decrease (insignificant) in mean numbers between 2007 and 2010.  
  
Table 22.—Changes in bovine assets on a per-capita basis, 
2000 to 2007 and 2010 
 
 Year of survey Significance level 
 2000 2007 2010 2000-10 2000-07 
Full sample  0.75 0.57 0.64 0.202 0.070 
      
RA  0.75 0.58 0.69 0.598 0.130 
CA  0.75 0.56 0.48 0.037 0.281 
      
NR2  0.73 0.51 0.64 0.660 0.040 
NR3  0.63 0.64 0.59 0.830 0.903 
NR4* 0.89 -- 0.67 0.150 -- 
*For households in NR4, information is only available for 2000 and 2010. 
Although such per-capita measures may better reflect the distribution of 
individual wealth, a household-level perspective tells us more about the resources 
available for agricultural production in terms of draught power. The increasing 
proportion of cattle-poor households suggests that household members who took 
cattle with them when starting their own farm (either in fast-track schemes or 
elsewhere) and the economic challenges that many households faced over the 
past decade (selling their cattle to meet basic needs), have stripped a 
considerable number of farmers of part or all of their resource base.  
 
One interesting observation in this context is that while most farmers experienced 
a decline in cattle wealth, some 15 percent of households have been able to 
accumulate cattle over the past 10 years. More detailed analysis is required to 
understand the determinants of these differential processes of accumulation and 
impoverishment. 
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7. Summary and conclusions 
 
Far too little empirical fieldwork has been done over the past 10 years, to 
understand the full scope of the impact of Zimbabwe’s economic decline on small-
scale agriculture and small holder farmers.  We conducted a small fieldwork 
exercise during 2010 to extend a larger, ongoing study that has been in operation 
since 1983.  In this paper, we identify (and quantify to a limited extent) certain 
important trends and highlight areas where the need for further examination 
seems important.   
 
The data we collected across 18 sites in three different provinces point to an 
overall decline in the size of rural households, especially in resettlement areas, to 
which people were once attracted because of their agricultural and economic 
success.  Now they are seeking livelihoods elsewhere, and more than half of all 
household members have migrated away from their original home areas since 
1999. 
 
A fundamental conclusion is that earning a livelihood from farming became 
extraordinarily more difficult during the past 10 years.  Inputs became—and 
remain—a major problem, and cropped areas—especially cash crops—have been 
reduced across our sample even though cropping diversity has increased, 
probably as a risk-management measure.  It is only contract farming and donor 
support in the form of free inputs provided to favoured areas that have prevented 
the small-scale farming landscape from becoming a wasteland.  Less-favoured 
areas have had to devise their own coping mechanisms.  And, overall, mean rates 
of fertilizer application to planted land have dropped to insignificant levels. 
 
Households have sought to modify their livelihood portfolios through a number of 
different approaches:  by migrating, by pursuing a wide range of non-farm 
activities and by using social networks and transfers. However, we find 
indications that these alternatives may not be as supportive now as they were in 
the past; certainly they have changed in nature. 
 
Among the most serious outcomes of the economic turmoil of the past decade 
has been the depletion of families’ livestock assets, even though some have 
managed to increase their herds.  The reduction in herds has not only weakened 
the overall economic resource base but it also has reduced the ability to manage 
the land resource through well-timed tillage.  Moreover, the divergent trajectories 
in cattle assets underscore a worrying trend emerging from the broader ZRHDS 
study:  the widening disparity in income and welfare levels among rural 
households. 
 
The work that we report in this paper identifies several areas where further 
analysis is urgently needed if we are to understand better how households can 
most effectively be assisted to exit the low-input agricultural productivity state in 
which they now find themselves and how their livelihoods can be enhanced. There 
is also a need to understand better what happens to the household’s asset base 
that supports agricultural activities when household members leave to join fast 
track or to seek other opportunities elsewhere.  This is particularly true in the 
original resettlement areas where so many families appear to be at the same 
stage in the household cycle, with many younger family members leaving home 
for multiple reasons.  All too often, proposals intended to spur agricultural 
development in Zimbabwe have completely ignored the dynamics of the 
household cycle, and some in-depth work here should yield substantial benefits. 
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